RTCM Paper 090-2018-SC134-009

# Key Issues for RTCM SC-134 and Proposed Globalstar Contributions

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# Motivation

- Recommend key areas of focus for SC-134 to support high-integrity vehicle applications
  - Additions to existing message content
  - Development of flexible protection level equations
- Make use of experience gained in RTCA development of SBAS and GBAS
- These are areas where Globalstar intends to contribute to the work of SC-134.

# Additional RTCM Message Content

- To support high-integrity applications, the following additional information is needed by users:
  - Overbounding error standard deviations (not just "best estimates")
  - Bounding error biases
  - Prior fault probabilities (of GNSS ranging sources and augmentation systems)
  - Emergency "do not use" messages to meet short times-to-alert (TTAs)

### **Bounding Standard Deviations ("Sigmas")**

- Range error standard deviations that bound actual errors (when applied in a Gaussian distribution) are needed to calculate highintegrity error bounds (protection levels) by users.
  - Ideally sent along with "best estimates" of standard deviations for each error source for which the augmentation system is responsible.
  - Separate broadcast of prior failure probabilities helps define required bounding probabilities.

- Bounds on residual error biases that may remain after correction/monitoring should also be broadcast.
  - Avoids the need to conservatively overbound bias errors with a larger overbounding sigma (as must be done in SBAS and GBAS).
  - As with sigma, preferable to broadcast both bounding and "best estimate" biases

- Rather than building fixed (assumed) prior fault probabilities into standards, these should be broadcast so that they can be modified as needed.
- Prior fault probabilities  $(P_f)$  include:
  - Single-satellite fault probabilities for each supported GNSS constellation (*P<sub>sat</sub>*)
  - Constellation (correlated) fault probabilities for each supported GNSS constellation (*P<sub>const</sub>*)
  - Fault probabilities for PPP/correction parameters provided by augmentation system (*P<sub>aug</sub>*)
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### **Prior Fault Probabilities (cont'd.)**

- Broadcast prior fault probabilities represent limits at which bounding error standard deviations and biases apply.
- Broadcast prior fault probabilities adjust "*K*-values" in user protection level equations:
  - Lower prior fault probability  $\rightarrow$  higher  $P_{MD}$  allowed at user  $\rightarrow$  lower  $K_{MD}$  required in user protection level equation  $\rightarrow$  smaller protection level (all else being equal)

### **Prior Fault Probabilities: Two Definitions**

- Failure Onset Probability (probability of transition from "nominal" to "failed" state per unit time)
  - Poisson approx.: not valid at beginning and end of SV life

$$P_{F,onset} \cong \frac{number \ of \ observed \ fault \ events}{total \ observation \ time}$$

$$MTBF \cong \frac{1}{P_{F,onset}} \equiv Mean Time Between Failures$$

- Failure State Probability (long term average probability of being in fault state)
  - exponential queuing approximation

$$P_{F,state} \cong \frac{MTTR}{MTBF + MTTR}$$

 $MTTR \equiv$  Mean Time To Repair (following failure onset)

### **Emergency "Do Not Use" Messages**

- When sudden, hazardous faults are detected by augmentation system, a simple and rapid means to notify users (before the next scheduled message update) is needed.
- In SBAS/WAAS, this capability is included within the "Fast Correction" messages.
  - Four identical consecutive messages inflate UDRE or set UDRE to "do not use" for one or more satellites
  - This is outside the normal message sequence
  - Multiple messages sent to assure correct reception within users' time to alert

#### **Protection Level Equations**

- Protection level equations translate rangedomain error bounds and fault probabilities (after corrections from augmentation system) into position-domain error bounds at the desired integrity probability.
  - Based on user's own GNSS satellite geometry
  - Based on user's own models for local errors and fault modes

### **Aviation Protection Level Equations**

• Under nominal conditions (H<sub>0</sub>):



- The maximum protection level across all nominal and faulted conditions is applied by the user.
  - Multiple different fault-condition protection levels may exist.
  - Faulted conditions without computed protection levels must be bounded by the maximum protection level.

#### **Augmented Protection Level Equations**

- Approach suggested for dual-frequency SBAS in [Walter, et al, ION GNSS 2010]:
- Nominal (*H*<sub>0</sub>) case:

Gaussian multiplier

to achieve required

P(HMI) (user-

specific)

$$VPL_{0} = K_{v,PA} \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{N} S_{3,i}^{2} \sigma_{ff,i}^{2}} + \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left| S_{3,i} b_{i} \right|$$

**\_** 

Bounding error sigma and bias (from RTCM broadcast; valid to broadcast prior fault prob.)

Faulted (H<sub>f</sub>) case (multiple fault scenarios k):

$$VPL_{1} = K_{v,md} \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{N} S_{3,i}^{2} \sigma_{ff,i}^{2}} + \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left| S_{3,i}b_{i} \right| + \max_{i} \left| S_{3,i}B_{i} \right|$$
Gaussian multiplier to  
achieve required P(HMI)  
(user-specific; incorporating  
prior fault prob.) RTCM Paper 090-2018-SC134-009 Vorst-case error  
to fault mode k

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### **SC-134 Protection Level Equations**

- Objective for SC-134 should be to develop a standardized format for protection level calculations that can be used by many different implementations:
  - Standalone GNSS (e.g., ARAIM or other user-specific integrity approaches)

> ARAIM "solution-separation" PL concept

- Augmented GNSS (WADGNSS, PPP, LADGNSS)
- User filtering of GNSS inputs (e.g., via Extended Kalman Filter, or EKF)
- Fusion with non-GNSS sensors
- Broadcast integrity information supports protectionlevel calculations while having each user take responsibility for his application of it.

## Summary

- This presentation proposes specific components of SC-134 work plan:
  - Additional integrity-related information in RTCM messages
  - Development of a flexible framework for user protection level calculations
- Protection-level development would be based upon the information provided in updated message types
- Protection-level development would support many different user implementations RTCM Paper 090-2018-SC134-009